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Generic assessment procedures for determining protective by International Atomic Energy Agency

By International Atomic Energy Agency

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3 of 3 BWR BASELINE COOLANT ISOTOPE CONCENTRATIONS Discussion: The gap and core melt cases assume the core of a 3000 MW(th) reactor that has been uncovered, damaged and recovered. It is assumed that the release from the core is uniformly mixed in the reactor coolant system and suppression pool. It also assumes that there is no dilution due to injection. 5 hour after shutdown of a core that has been through at least one refuelling cycle. These tables will overestimate the concentrations of Cs for a reactor that has been operating for less than 18 months (a) (b) (c) NC Nudide Normal to 100 times normal concentration (a) P 20% Gap Release (b) IkBq/gl Concentration After > 10% Core Melt Release (bXc) [kBq/g] 1-131 7E-02 to 7E+00 8E+03 4E+04 Cs-134 IE-03 to IE-01 8E+02 4E+03 Cs-137 3E-03 to 3E-01 6E+02 3E+03 Ba-140 2E-02 to 2E+00 NC 7E+03 Based on ANSI84, should be replaced with site specific normal isotopic concentration Assumes a release from the fuel for this level of core damage before the core is recovered with water.

Exothermic Zr-H2O reaction (self sustaining) with rapid H2 generation 100% gap release Fuel heat-up rate increases by a factor of 2 or 3 Rapid fuel cladding failure and local fuel melting Rapid release of volatile fission products 10-50 % core melt Possible relocation (slump) of molten core Possible un-coolable core even if recovered with water >1 100% core melt Possible melt through of vessel and containment failure even if core is recovered with water. Source:NRC93 49 Performed by: PROCEDURE A2b Nuclear Condition Assessment Manager CORE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT BASED ON CONTAINMENT RADIATION LEVELS Pg.

Unavailability or unreliable functioning of safety system instruments or controls in the control room for more than 30 minutes. Failure of one or more safety system components will result in unco very of the core or spent fuel (Loss of redundancy in safety systems) Actual or predicted safety system failures which increase the risk of core or spent fuel damage projected or confirmed vessel water level below the top of irradiate fuel or major (100 - 1000 x) increases in multiple radiation monitors or other indications of actual or imminent core damage LOSS OF FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS Major increased risk of core or spent fuel damage.

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